Notes on Factors that determine Voting Behaviour

What factors determine voting behaviour?

Gender: this is a somewhat negligible factor, though there are certain differences. In the 1997 election, women were more likely to vote Labour. This may have been as a result of the family-friendly policies of the Labour party, e.g. SureStart.

- The Fawcett society found that in the 2017 general election, women were 2.5% less likely to say they were certain to vote. Nevertheless, this doesn’t translate into historical trends - in 1997 women were more likely to vote than men, but it was the opposite in 2010.

- Plays heavily with age - in the 2015 general election, younger women were 16.5% more likely to vote Labour than young men.

Class: continuing process of class dealignment, where traditional class-based voting interests become less pronounced and lose their influence. This is not to say that people don’t still vote based on their own economic interests.

- In 2017, those who identified as ‘old middle class’ were far less likely to vote Labour (28%) than those who identified as ‘new middle class’ (41%). The progression from the 2015 to the 2017 election quite clearly shows the process of class dealignment - in 2015, 27% of those who identified as ‘working class’ voted Conservative, but in 2017, 45% did.

- Those with a degree (and who are more likely to be middle class) were more likely to vote Labour in 2017 - 39% for Conservatives and 48% for Labour. However, those with no education were also more likely to vote Labour - 46% to 44% Conservative.

- Reflects broader shifts in the economy towards a service industry.

- One would assume that a socialist platform would attract more working class voters, but there are many other issues affecting this, for instance issues around foreign policy and law and order. Many of the ‘core’ Labour voters are far more socially conservative. Labour lost Stoke-On-Trent but gained Kensington.

- Significant differences in turnout between classes. In 2017, turnout among AB was 83%, whereas for C2 and D was 52%. This 31% difference, though exceptionally high, is part of a consistent trend.

Age: a highly significant factor. YouGov found that 66% of 18-19 year olds voted Labour in the 2017 general election, and 69% of those who were 70+ voted Conservative.

- Turnout for the young is normally significantly lower than for the old - it was 84% among 70+.

- ‘Youthquake’ in the 2017 general election. This saw Labour gain control of younger, metropolitan constituencies like Canterbury.

- Increasing division between older and younger generation on class; Conservatives increased their support among old middle class from 2015 to 2017, from 54% to 59%.

Ethnicity: not a particularly important factor, though ethnic minorities are more traditionally inclined to vote Labour, perhaps because of their historical commitment to racial equality and progressive, anti-poverty measures. For instance, Harold Wilson’s Race Relations Act 1965.

- In the 2010 election, 60% of ethnic minorities voted Labour but only 16% for the Conservatives.

- Turnout is lower for those from ethnic minority backgrounds - 51% versus 67%. However, the BME population rose from 5% of the total population in 1991 to 13% in 2011.

- Number of constituencies where BME are 40+% of the population have risen from 7 in 1991 to 49 according to the 2011 census. It’s becoming a more important factor.

Region: strong regional bias. In former industrial areas with high structural unemployment there remains much animosity towards Conservatives and the legacy of Thatcher. For instance, in Liverpool in the 2010 general election, Labour won five times as many votes as the Conservatives in the five constituencies.

- Issues that are salient in the South are not resonant in the North.

- Regional pride, for instance in Scotland, has resulted in the collapse of Labour. In the 2015 general, Labour were reduced to just 2 MPs. Perhaps a form of instrumental voting?

- Labour is increasingly losing support in traditional working class seat and increasing it in more metropolitan constituencies. Emma Dent Coad narrowly won Kensington for Labour, a metropolitan and liberal area, but Corbyn is increasingly being seen as more appealing to socially liberal voters than economically left-wing ones.

1979 General Election Party policies and manifestos: both Labour and the Conservative manifestos were notable for their moderation - both proposed to bring inflation down. Callaghan was, though an ‘old Labour’ Prime Minister, part of Labour’s right wing, and he resisted many of the left-wing proposals. Thatcher, though mentioning returning recently nationalised industries to private hands and removing some trade union powers, made no suggestion of a radical crusade to scale down the state. Campaign: Callaghan’s ‘crisis? What crisis?’ gaffe added weight to the Conservatives’ claims that the country needed a new economic direction. The Conservatives adopted many of the techniques of modern advertising, under the guidance of Gordon Reece and Tim Bell. Thatcher made effective use of photo opportunities. Though Callaghan was 20 points ahead of Thatcher in terms of who would make a better Prime Minister, it was the wider political context that determined the outcome of the election. Context: Callaghan’s government lost a vote of no-confidence prior to the election, and he mistimed it; there was widespread expectation that he would call an election in 1978, but he backed away from doing it. This was shortly followed by the winter of discontent which had disastrous political implications - same mistake made by Brown. Perception that Callaghan was failing to deal with unions. Vote against Labour: Healey, the Chancellor, came under criticism on his tour around Scotland.

1997 General Election Party policies and manifestos: Blair drove the modernisation of Labour. ‘New Labour’ abandoned the traditional Labour policies of nationalisation, high taxation and the strengthening of trade union powers. Gave off tough signals on law and order, an issue that mattered to voters following rising crime rates in the early 1880s. Blair emphasised his links to the business community. Won the endorsement of the press, including the Sun and the Times. 1997 platform stressed specific policy details, e.g. smaller class sizes and cutting hospital waiting lists, or reducing child poverty. Constitutional reform was very important - common ground with the Liberal democrats. Easier for Liberal Democrats to vote tactically for Labour in marginal seats. The importance of constitutional reform was shown by the fact that all but 1 of the then-new 34 Liberal Democrat MPs in England came at the expense of the Conservatives. Conservatives won no seats in Wales or Scotland. McKibbin sees 1997 as a result of the contradictions of Conservative government. The deflationary, monetarist rhetoric, it was assumed in 1979, would alone mobilise the electorate. But this was not the case. The government had to decide whether it was ‘productionist’ or ‘consumptionist’. It was ‘productionist’ in its deflationary policy, thought that thrift, hard work, managerialism. But this was unpopular. Government’s recourse was a ‘consumptionist’ boom fuelled by North Sea oil. As long as you were in the right time at the right place, you could make money easily and quickly. This led to the notion of citizen as consumer. Britain, though, did not have the productive capacity to maintain the Lawson boom. There is only so much privatization and oil can do. Black Wednesday obliterated the Conservative party line that all other parties were incompetent and they were the stable managers. The government’s notion of ‘popular capitalism’ and idea that shares in selling off state owned assets and right-to-buy would create a clientele wedded to the Conservative party. This has certainly had an ideological impact, but large pension funds and wealthy investors disproportionately gained. These effectively constituted large payments by the taxpayer since many of the assets were sold at extremely low prices. At the same time, top rates of taxes were slashed and customary constraints on executive pay were reduced. This was not particularly popular with the electorate, indeed it contributed to a growing sense of resentment as people realised that they were not sharing in this new capitalist bonanza. There was a sense that the Conservative idea of ‘hard work’ and ‘thrift’ had been exposed as a sham against the extraordinary greed and absurd behaviour of Britain’s boardrooms who were profiting off of undervalued public assets. Thatcher was seen as a very authoritarian leader, particularly due to her promotion of centralised authority and dismissal of constitutional reform. This was viewed unfavourably. Contradiction between Thatcher’s idea of starting a revolution to sweep away the ‘wetness’ and the inefficiency, implying a radical and critical edge, and the fact that her ideology was essentially reactionary. New Labour, in their election campaign, placed a big emphasis on developing a professional vote-winning process, employing public relations experts to handle the media. Alastair Campbell played an important role in this. Importance shouldn’t be overstated. Share of the vote increased by 12.5% of the seats it targeted, but by 13.4% in the constituencies it neglected. Turnout was relatively low at 71.4%, so only 30% of the registered electorate voted Labour. Perhaps more accurate to describe it as the failure of the Conservative government. They had lost their reputation as competent economic managers. Big impact of sleaze. Reinforced the perception that the Conservatives were faded compared to the new, professional Labour. There was a larger swing to Labour among women (10%) rather than men (8%) Substantial impact of the media. Much of the press got behind Blair - ‘Sun Wot Won It’. Blair made a conscious effort to get on good terms with Murdoch. Met with him, along with the New Labour team, on the Cayman Islands. It is unclear about the actual impact the Sun had, though it was undoubtedly true that media backing across the establishment press helped Labour (but much of the press still backed Conservatives). Possible that right-wing broadsheets like the Telegraph and (though more establishment) the Times were becoming less important. Spin doctors as Campbell attempted a deliberate strategy of press management and pushing the Labour message at all times, with MPs towing a deliberate and consistent line. Context of embourgeoisement meant that Labour were losing their traditional bases of support as unions and manufacturing, heavy industries, were decimated by Thatcherism (reduced manufacturing base by 30%). Blair appealed to what he thought of as the Mondeo Man. He wanted social advancement and was interested in policies of reward rather than redistribution (typically from C1, aspirational lower middle class). 41% of ABs voted Conservative, 50% of C2s, 59% of DEs voted Labour. But since 1992, the Conservatives share among AB decreased by 15%.

The Oliphaunts of Brexit

I published this article in 'Social Europe' some months ago. The notion of 'Parliamentary gridlock' is looking more and more like an immovable object, even despite Theresa May's attempts to psychologically intimidate MPs into voting for her deal through large amounts of funding for a no-deal scenario. 

The recent anti-Brexit march represented an exciting burst of democratic participation. As a young person, it was incredible to be part of a march that proved that we are not apathetic, but care deeply about the cosmopolitan, liberal values that can best be achieved through cooperation with our European neighbours via the EU.

It was disappointing to have to face accusations that we were part of an anti-democratic faction seeking to crush the will of the people. After all, what is more democratic: the mantras dogmatically repeated by a minority of hardline Eurosceptic backbenchers, or the largest political march since the Iraq War?

The simple fact is that a second referendum represents a solution to the highly likely scenario that Theresa May will be unable to get a deal through Parliament. Logistically, it is nearly impossible that she will get a deal that will simultaneously satisfy the Remainer MPs, the DUP and the European Research Group. Parliamentary gridlock looms large, and a second referendum is the only sensible way out of this.

It is certain, though, that any deal Theresa May comes back with will vary substantially from what we were promised in the EU referendum. When the public voted, at least a significant portion of those who voted Brexit wanted to retain membership of the customs union, or merely have a looser arrangement, like Norway, for instance. There were also false promises made over the transition agreement, the European Court of Justice and the ease with which negotiations could take place.

But, as Jacob Rees-Mogg pointed out in a recent Twitter post, ‘we have already had a People’s vote’. Except, we haven’t. When the public voted, they did not know what the actual deal would look like, so to imply that they’ve endorsed any deal irrespective of its merits is ludicrous. To use the analogy of a protestor on BBC News, if you were engaged to someone and they turned out to be a psychopath just before the wedding, you would be well within your rights to cancel the whole affair.

It is deeply frustrating that the response to any form of democratic engagement is simply a dogmatic insistence that ‘the people have spoken’. It is maddening to have everything that I care so deeply about trampled by those who have a Jihadic certainty in the merits of their own post-Brexit utopia.

The Tory right are like the Oliphaunts in Lord of the Rings - ancient, blundering creatures, impervious to nuance or compromise. And they are trampling us all in their wake.

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To what extent do socialists agree on the economy?

Although socialists are united in their recognition of the atomising effects of capitalism, it will be argued that there is nevertheless substantial, irreconcilable divergence within socialism on the economy. ‘The economy’ can be defined as the relations between different economic agents. On the one hand, Marxists assert that capitalism is inherently exploitative, and is doomed to collapse as a result of its internal contradictions. On the other, social democrats and third-way proponents argue that capitalism can be reformed, and that the ‘internal contradictions’ that Marx predicted had not materialised. However, there are also significant differences within each of these individual strands, particularly within the revolutionary socialist tradition.

All socialists agree that capitalism can have detrimental consequences for the wellbeing of the general population. Though there is divergence on the extent to which capitalism should therefore be reformed, Marxists, democratic socialists and advocates of the third-way accept that a free market economy can have atomising effects, destroying bonds of community and mutual recognition (similar to Durkheim’s ‘anomie’). Marx, for instance, argued that capitalism alienates the workers from each other and the products of their labour, whilst Giddens accepted that the ‘selfish’ brand of capitalism of Thatcher ignores the underlying tendency of humans towards sympathy and cooperation, stressing the importance of community. Socialists similarly recognise that capitalism produces inequality, which can be economically inefficient and socially destructive; Anthony Crosland, a social democrat, therefore argued in ‘The Future of Socialism’ for programs of income redistribution, whilst both Giddens and Crosland support of the idea of ‘equality of opportunity’. Though revolutionary socialists disagree that capitalism can be reformed, asserting that it is inherently exploitative, there is nevertheless agreement between Rosa Luxembourg and Marx that capitalism is doomed to collapse and must be replaced by a communist system. Further, both Luxembourg and Giddens can be seen to recognise the attributes of a globalised capitalist system. Luxembourg, in ‘the Accumulation of Capital’, foresaw the global spread of the free market into less economically developed markets, whilst Giddens recognised that the dominance of globalisation meant countries had to provide competitive economic policies. On balance, though, these areas of agreement are exceeded by the substantial and irreconcilable divergence among socialists on the economy.

Though socialists agree that inequality is generally a destructive force, they do not agree on the extent to which it should be reduced. There is a clear difference between Marxists, who advocate absolute equality, and social democrats and third-way proponents, who argue that this is economically impractical. Instead, Crosland and Giddens place far more emphasis on equality of opportunity. Nevertheless, there is a clear distinction between social democrats and third way proponents. Social democrats accept widespread wealth redistribution to achieve relative equality, though Giddens rejected the extensive social engineering that underpinned such schemes. Instead, in his view, a ‘social investment state’ would provide a ‘contract’ between government and citizen so as to discourage a culture of dependency. Socialists also strongly disagree on the ownership of the economy, as utopian socialists such as Emile Babeuf thought that the origins of private property lay in violence and exploitation; others, such as Charles Fourier, advocated the organisation of society into ‘phalanxes’ where workers are able to democratically control the means of production. However, Beatrice Webb thought that the centralised state should gradually take over the running of public services. Assuming workers to be too ‘self-interested’ and selfish to run their own affairs, she thought that socialism could only be delivered through the coordinated efforts of highly trained specialists and administrators. Anthony Crosland, however, thought that the collective ownership of the economy in post-war Britain had gone far enough, theorising that the internal contradictions of capitalism that Marx had predicted (including the increasing division between worker and capital owner) had not materialised due to the dispersal of business ownership through the extension of democracy and industrial bargaining. Further, Giddens entirely rejected state ownership of the economy, advocating the importance of private property and asserting the primacy of the market over the government - in his view, ‘top down’ state intervention was both ineffective and inefficient.

In conclusion, therefore, socialists disagree far more on the economy than they agree. There are significant, irreconcilable differences between the various strands of socialism, for instance, democratic socialists think that capitalism can be gradually reformed and replaced with socialism (through Webb’s ‘inevitability of gradualness’), whilst social democrats and third way proponents disagree that capitalism will ‘replaced’. Revolutionary socialists, meanwhile, state that capitalism cannot be reformed, as it is inherently exploitative; this particular contrast was clearly highlighted by the antagonistic relationship between Luxembourg and Eduard Bernstein. There is a clear contrast between the Marxist notion - of the inherent contradictions in capitalism, rejection of private property, and belief that capitalism alienates humans from their cooperative nature - and the view proposed by Giddens that capitalism even encouraged positive attributes like responsibility. Within the revolutionary socialist tradition, Marx and Luxembourg disagreed about the economic circumstances through which revolution could arise (Luxembourg arguing that it could occur spontaneously in societies that had not reached ‘late-stage’ capitalism). Though all socialists recognise that an ideal society is one which is more equal, where there are bonds of mutual cooperation rather than an ‘atomistic’ collection of individuals, overall socialists disagree far more on the economy than they agree.

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Chris Grayling's Abysmal Record

There have been many ministerial resignations since 2010; many failings and comical blunders. But surely none have failed with the consistency and inane predictability of Mr Grayling. As Owen Jones points out in his opinion piece in the Guardian, Grayling is a 'source of inspiration to mediocre white men everywhere, who, however much they lack ability, can still look forward to wielding power' (1).

There are ample effective and pragmatic candidates who could fill his place, yet bizarrely each failing is simply followed by an appointment elsewhere. It's as though we are living in a permanent state of anticlimax; like Druids who may dare to dream that this time, maybe, finally, the world may end, the Government believes with each successive reappointment of Mr Grayling that perhaps, this time, his tenure will not end in shame.

The warning signs came before the Conservative Government of 2010. Between 2001 and 2009, he was widely criticised for claiming expenses for his flat in Pimlico, despite having a constituency home less than 17 miles away (2). As Shadow Home Secretary, he was responsible for the publication of statistics on crime levels that the chairman of the UK Statistics Authority said were 'likely to mislead the public' and 'likely to damage public trust in official statistics' (3). He was also largely excluded from the 2010 Conservative election campaign following his comments on gay couples in B&Bs (4).

Of course, before 2010, Grayling did have some successes - particularly, for instance, his questioning of David Blunkett, the then Work & Pensions Secretary, over his business affairs, leading to Blunkett's resignation (5). Nevertheless, this article will seek to demonstrate that his considerable failings are, irrespective of his achievements (to every reasonable extent) sufficient to make us question why is still a minister.

As a Minister at the DWP, he left 100,000 job-centre staff redundant (6), at the same time as criticising families for being habitually unemployed for generation after generation. As Justice Minister, he reduced Prison Officer numbers in prisons by 5,000 from 2012 to 2015 (7); subsequently, the Institute for Fiscal Studies warned that underfunding in prisoners led to 'safety... being compromised'.

In 2014 he was condemned by both prison reformers and writers such as Philip Pullman for banning books in prisons. He introduced court fees which required defendants who pleaded guilty to pay £150. He sold expertise in prisons and probation to Saudi Arabia, a move that attracted criticism from both main parties; he cut legal aid for prisoners, a move condemned by the Howard League and which to the first strike in British history by barristers and solicitors (8). 

His reforms can be objected to on both an ideological and an objective level. On the latter, the utter failure of his tenure was shown when Michael Gove reversed every single policy listed above (8). They had become so politically toxic and impractical that it was not possible for them to continue. On a subjective ideological level, the aspects of Grayling's tenure as Justice Secretary saw the erosion of human rights and a blinkered view of crime and its causes. His toughening of sentences and banning of books for prisoners were utterly wrongheaded in that they tackled the symptoms of crime, and not the cause. This stems from an ideology that places blind faith in responsibility to the point that it becomes absurd; criminals, disproportionately poor and badly educated, should be seen as the victims of terrible upbringings that no one should have to endure, rather than intrinsically 'bad' people. 

So perhaps, after a tenure as Justice Secretary widely derided by figures from across the political spectrum, Grayling could be vilified by a pragmatic, cross-party approach when he was appointed Transport Secretary in 2016? Alas, within a few months, he was criticised for putting his party interests ahead of commuters when a leaked letter to Boris Johnson justified his opposition to the provision of the metro services to TfL on the grounds that it would put the services 'in the clutches of a Labour mayor' (9). 

Shortly after, he faced a vote of no-confidence in the House of Commons after criticism of a major rail timetable change. He only narrowly won it, by 305-285 (10). Train punctuality has sunk to a 13-year low, while rail fares have again been raised in an era in which British workers have suffered the worst stagnation in wages since the Napoleonic wars (11). Since 2010, local authority funding for bus routes in England and Wales has been cut by 45% (12), depriving local communities of important sources of mobility. 

Given his terrible record, the most recent piece of news is hardly surprising. He awarded a £13.8m contract to charter extra ferries in a no-deal Brexit scenario to a company that doesn't have any ferries, and has never run a ferry service (13). 

Despite all of this, though, Grayling is probably not responsible for most of the woes of our transport and criminal justice systems. Instead, he is merely symptomatic of a belief system that takes social conservatism and a free market model to absurd lengths. Far from the belief that imposing tougher sentences will improve recidivism rates, countries that have rehabilitative justice systems that put compassion ahead of a belief that people just need to be 'taught a lesson' are safer and don't need as many prisons in the very first place (14). The privatisation of the railway system, indeed, is one of the best examples of how attempts to introduce competition can cause breakdowns in accountability and errors in communication. Grayling, like the rainy, cold weather, and the hours stood on bus and railway stations, has become a fixture of national life; staggering from crisis to crisis, his ability to make terrible policy decisions and remain a minister is a strangely impressive feat of endurance. 

1) https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2019/jan/02/chris-grayling-cabinet-minister-rail-fare-hikes-transport

2) https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/newstopics/mps-expenses/5305242/Chris-Grayling-claimed-for-London-flat-despite-nearby-constituency-home-MPs-expenses.html

3) https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/crime/7402232/Full-scale-of-violent-crime-revealed.html

4) https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2010/apr/11/chris-gayling-gays-bb

5) https://www.scotsman.com/news/politics/blunkett-clings-on-for-survival-1-1102680

6) https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chris_Grayling#cite_note-6

7) https://www.theguardian.com/society/2014/dec/05/prison-book-ban-unlawful-court-chris-grayling

8)https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-37854358

9) https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2016/dec/07/chris-grayling-accused-of-putting-politics-over-people-in-rail-letter-leak

10) https://hansard.parliament.uk/Commons/2018-06-19/debates/BEAD9CD9-195A-49EB-B333-60987BF95E6A/ConfidenceInTheSecretaryOfStateForTransport

11) https://www.theguardian.com/money/2019/jan/02/rail-fare-increases-prompt-protests-at-stations-across-uk

12) https://www.theguardian.com/society/2018/jul/10/local-bus-services-council-routes-jobs-hospitals-gps

13) https://blogs.spectator.co.uk/2019/01/chris-graylings-ferry-company-fails-to-deliver/

14) https://www.businessinsider.com/why-norways-prison-system-is-so-successful-2014-12?r=UK&IR=T

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To what extent do anarchists agree on the nature of a future society? (A Level Politics essay)

I wrote this as part of the ideologies part of my A-Level.

Although anarchists agree in the abolition of the state, believing it to be an unjustifiably coercive force upon the individual, there are substantial differences on what a future society should look like. Though there is agreement, to some extent, on the basis of human nature (since all anarchists believe that we are inherently rational), there is a stark difference between Stirner’s Egoistic view and the cooperative vision of humans outlined by Kropotkin’s Mutual Aid theory; this, in turn, leads to very different conceptions of what a future society would look like. Collectivists, for instance, advocate self-governing communities in the absence of capitalism, whilst anarcho-capitalists like Murray Rothbard believe in the replacement of government through private firms.

Nevertheless, anarchists still reject Lockean notions of a social contract that underpins a society based on consent to the authority of a state. Emma Goldman, for instance, thought that, far from a state being need to arbitrate disputes and protect us from the state of nature, we are capable of leading peaceful and productive lives unrestricted by external force. In ‘Living My Life’, she argued that the provision of education would develop those inherently social and curious aspects of humans, which would reduce the tendency within capitalism to cause us to compete rather than cooperate (what Einstein termed a ‘primitive’ state of development). Godwin similarly thought that we are capable of ‘perpetual’ reason, negating the need for external authority. Anarchists also agree on the tendency of religion to support unjustified authority. Stirner, an Egoist, rejected such belief systems on the grounds that they restrict the Ego, which is sovereign. Likewise, Goldman argued that the Church was just as oppressive as any state and stood in the way of human progress, since the concept of ‘the meek inheriting the earth’ perpetuated a ‘slave mentality’. In addition, both collectivist and anarcho-capitalists oppose taxation; collectivists, because it implies involvement in an alienating and exploitative capitalist system sanctioned through state violence and anarcho-capitalists such as Robert Nozick, because it’s akin to forced labour (in that it effectively constitutes time spent working for the government). Indeed, the pacifistic element within anarchism lead some, such as Henry David Thoreau, to oppose taxation on the grounds that it supported the bloody conflicts of the state (particularly, in Thoreau’s case, the Mexican-American War). However, such similarities stem from a radically different conception of human nature, and in reality the collectivist and anarcho-capitalist visions of a future society are starkly opposed.

Whereas collectivist anarchists assert a fundamentally sociable and plastic human nature, individualist anarchists like Ayn Rand believe that we are naturally rational, selfish and self-serving. In ‘Atlas Shrugged’, for instance, Rand asserts that greed is a ‘virtue’ and reflective of our selfish nature. In contrast, Kropotkin proposed, through his theory of mutual aid, that we are sociable - since those species that are cooperative are most likely to prosper, and cooperation is human’s most natural state, any future anarchist society should be constructed around the principle of collective ownership rather than competition. Murray Rothbard, in contrast, asserted that pursuing one’s own self-interest was not only natural, but also beneficial for economic prosperity. Rothbard envisaged a society of unregulated economic agents each acting according to the incentives of the free market, rather than, in contrast to Kropotkin, working in small economic communities where the means of production was collectively owned and taking according to need. This stark division on human nature extends to a contrasting attitude to individual liberty, since Stirner (an Egoist), rejected the notion of community at all (and anarcho-capitalists similarly envisage an atomistic conception of society) whereas anarcho-syndicalists and anarcho-communists see no contradiction between the collective - and the imposition of equality - and the individual. This, in part, assumes a plastic view of human nature, since capitalism necessitates selfish and individualistic behaviour. Kropotkin argued that, assuming a more holistic and rounded education, humans would display their true cooperative characteristics, so the need to restrict freedom in a Hobbesian sense would not exist. Though thinkers such as Emma Goldman perhaps act as a bridge between the individualist and collectivist strands, Stirner’s ‘Ego’ and Kropotkin’s ‘cooperation’ in reality lead to an irreconcilable conception of a future society.

Further, there are also differences within the collectivist anarchist tradition regarding the economy. Kropotkin, for instance, advocated a system of anarcho-communism whereby people would be free to join whichever community they wanted; these communities would, as far as possible, be self-sufficient. Bakunin, whilst accepting the abolition of capitalism and its replacement with a system of self-governing communities, placed more emphasis on the cooperation between communities based on the exchange of goods and services according to their true value. Proudhon differed from both, since in ‘What is Property?’ (1840), he not only advocated a ‘people’s bank’, which could recycle surplus funds to productive units, but also the voluntary engagement of workers into free contracts. Further, anarcho-capitalists have a radically different view of a future economy, since they advocate the unrestricted workings of the invisible hand to efficiently allocate resources. Rothbard asserted that all aspects of the state could be privatised; for instance, law and order could be run by protective agencies. However, Stirner’s future society differs from both anarcho-communists and anarcho-capitalists in that it views unrestrained Egos spontaneously coming together in the rational interests of all (rather than being constrained by social obligation and belief systems).

In conclusion, therefore, anarchists disagree on the nature of a future society far more than they agree. Not only do collectivist anarchists oppose capitalism on the grounds that it imposes a selfish, alienating system on fundamentally social beings, there are various mutually exclusive versions of what an anarchist society would look like. Although Egoists like Max Stirner, in addition to collectivists, oppose private property, and anarcho-capitalists could perhaps be better described as ‘minarchists’, the difference between the competing strands of anarchism stem from a fundamentally opposed view of human nature that sees the profit motive reflecting a selfish, individualistic streak, pitted against the sociable and cooperative nature that can be altered and made perfectible.

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